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Abstract 
 
In this article, a comparison is drawn between the role of good 
faith in the development of the Roman law of contract and the 
emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of 
contract. Firstly, it is shown how the idea of good faith as an open 
norm in Roman law was inspired by Greek philosophy and it is 
argued that ubuntu as an underlying value of the customary law 
can infuse good faith in the common law of contract in similar 
fashion. Secondly, an important distinction between the two 
concepts is identified. Although both concepts promote 
contractual justice between the contracting parties, ubuntu 
entails a further duty to promote the social and economic well-
being of the parties as well as that of the greater community. 
Hence, in contrast to good faith, ubuntu is concerned with the 
promotion of substantive equality in private dealings. 
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The values of ubuntu … if consciously harnessed can become central to the 
process of harmonising all existing legal values and practices with the 
Constitution. Ubuntu can therefore become central to a new South African 
jurisprudence and to the revival of sustainable African values as part of the 
broader process of the African renaissance.1 
1 Introduction 
In the previous article,2 it was shown how the Romans realised that their 
existing formal and rigid laws could not address the community's changing 
legal needs due to the influx of foreign traders into Rome. They introduced 
flexible legal procedures and a more normative approach to these legal 
transactions to ensure better contractual justice. This worked so well that 
the new flexible procedures and normative principles were transferred to the 
existing formalistic law. Gradually, the existing ius civile became subject to 
a more normative interpretation in the interests of justice through the use of 
the open norm of good faith. It was argued that in a similar way, ubuntu can 
be used to address legal pluralism in the South African legal system and its 
application as an underlying value of the Constitution of the Republic of 
South Africa, 1996 (hereafter the Constitution) could result in the better use 
of the open norm of good faith in the common law of contract.  
In this article, two further themes are explored. The first theme is the 
harmonisation of values from different legal systems and the second theme 
deals with the concretisation of open norms intended to realise contractual 
justice. As in the previous article, with each theme the Roman law 
developments are discussed, followed by a comparison with the emerging 
role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract. Finally, this 
article concludes by summarising the findings in both articles. 
                                            
* Hanri du Plessis. LLB LLM (UP) LLD (UNISA). Senior Lecturer, Department of 
Private Law, School of Law, University of South Africa. E-mail: dplesh@unisa.ac.za. 
The article forms part of research undertaken during a period of research and 
development leave granted by Unisa in 2019. Parts of this article are also based on 
research forming part my unpublished thesis (Du Plessis Good Faith and Ubuntu in 
South African Contract Law). The research for my thesis was funded by a grant from 
Unisa's Academic Qualification Improvement Programme from 2014 to 2017. Any 
opinions or conclusions expressed in this article are my own and Unisa does not 
accept any liability for them. Similarly, all errors remain my own. 
1  Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 11. 
2  Du Plessis 2019 PELJ https://journals.assaf.org.za/index.php/per/article/view/6456 
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2 Harmonising values from different legal systems 
2.1 Good faith: Harmonisation between Roman and Greek ideas? 
It is generally accepted that Greek culture exerted some influence on 
Roman life during the later Republic3 including the Roman legal system.4 
However, the extent to which Roman law was influenced by Greek ideas 
remains a controversial issue, and this is also the case when determining 
the origin and development of bona fides (good faith) in Roman contract 
law. One theory is that bona fides originated from the Roman concept of 
fides and is therefore indigenous to Roman law, but it has also been argued 
that Greek influences can be identified in the development of bona fides, 
especially in its role in correcting and adapting the ius civile. The next 
section attempts to trace the development from fides to bona fides, after 
which the following section considers the possible foreign influences on 
bona fides as used to correct and adapt the ius civile. 
2.1.1 From fides to bona fides 
Law (ius) was not the only code that governed Roman society. Outside the 
law, there were various customs (mores)5 that determined the social status 
of each Roman and prescribed his rights and duties.6 Zimmerman7 explains 
that Roman law tended to interfere with these social aspects of Roman life 
as little as possible because they were already governed by their own 
regulatory devices, one of which was fides. According to legend, fides was 
the first virtue in Rome to be personified as a goddess.8 Roman literary 
tradition dates the cult of Fides to the early monarchy, when it was 
introduced by the second king of Rome, Numa Pompilius (around 700 BC).9 
A temple was also built in her honour in the city of Rome at around 250 
BC.10 The religious origin of fides illustrates the importance of fides to the 
                                            
3  Kaser Roman Private Law 3-4; Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 8. 
4  Kaser Roman Private Law 4; Schulz Roman Legal Science 38-39 refers to this period 
in Roman law as the "Hellenistic period". For a general account of possible Greek 
influences on Roman law see Kunkel Roman History 98-105. 
5  Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 587 sv "Mores (mos)". 
6  Schulz Principles of Roman Law 21. Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 28-29. 
7  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 350. 
8  Verboven "Fides" 2670. Also see Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 
78-79 n 96 argues that the goddess "Fides was probably an idolisation of the concept 
of fides". 
9  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Gruen 1982 Athenaeum 59. 
10  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Schulz Principles of Roman Law 224. 
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Romans.11 Furthermore, fides played an important role in the Roman 
monarchy and continued to do so during the republican period.12  
It has been argued that despite its religious origins fides developed into a 
moral and social construct13 which manifested in various aspects of Roman 
society.14 As a result, it had various meanings depending on the context in 
which it was used.15 At its most essential, fides was described as "keeping 
one's word" or being “bound by one's word".16 In this context, Cicero is often 
quoted: 
Moreover, the keeping of faith [fides] is fundamental to justice, that is 
constancy and truth in what is said and agreed. Therefore … let us trust that 
keeping faith (fides) is so called because what has been said is actually done 
(fiat).17  
Fides was considered a central virtue in Roman society18 and it was of the 
utmost importance for a Roman citizen to keep his or her word.19 Fidelity 
was one of the standard principles of Roman life20 and failure to remain 
faithful to one's word would result in a social blot against one's reputation.21 
In this context fides recognises the moral duties of fidelity and faithfulness.22  
A more social construction of fides maintains that fides combines two 
meanings, namely trust and trustworthiness.23 A relationship based on fides 
denoted a relationship between two parties where "the one trusted and 
                                            
11  Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 59. 
12  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 77-79; 
Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 6-7. 
13  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 164-165; Litvinoff 1997 Tul L Rev 1651; Lind "The Republic 
and Roman Morality" 6. The original meaning of fides is uncertain and various 
theories exist (Gruen 1982 Athenaeum 51). 
14  Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 7. 
15  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 78; Schulz 
Principles of Roman Law 223. 
16  Schulz Principles of Roman Law 223, who describes this definition of fides as the 
essential meaning of fides. Also see Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract 
Law" 78; Kaser Roman Private Law 33. 
17  Cicero De Officiis 1 23 (quoted from Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
18  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 8; Schulz 
Principles of Roman Law 223. 
19  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 115. 
20  Schulz Principles of Roman Law 223. 
21  Verboven "Fides" 2670; Schulz Principles of Roman Law 224. 
22  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 77; 
Schulz Principles of Roman Law 223.  
23  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165 esp n 67, 168; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman 
Contract Law" 79; Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties xlvi; Lind "The Republic and 
Roman Morality" 7. 
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relied upon the other".24 In this context, fides required that a person should 
keep his word and display consideration and leniency towards those under 
his protection25 or towards those to whom he had a social obligation.26 
Accordingly, fides prescribed expected behaviour in daily life, and in 
particular what behaviour was expected in specific social relationships.27 As 
both parties were bound by the principles of fides a mutual confidence 
existed between them, which was reciprocal in nature.28 In this framework 
fides manifested as a principle that underlay social relations.29 An example 
of a Roman relationship that was governed by fides was the relationship 
between a patron and his clients (clientela).30 Clients were poor Roman 
citizens (for example peasants, artisans or workers) who entered into a 
special relationship with a wealthy Roman citizen (a patron) for whom they 
executed work and from whom in turn they received social and legal 
protection.31 The relationship based on clientela created reciprocal duties 
which were governed by fides rather than law.32 This meaning of fides was 
also accentuated in the old fiduciary relationships (for example, between 
guardian and ward) which later developed into legal actions with the 
development of the bonae fidei iudicia.33 These relationships prescribed a 
specific standard of behaviour that was required from both parties. For 
example, the guardian had to administer his ward's affairs as if they were 
his own.34  
It has been asked how the indigenous Roman principle of fides35 that 
applied between Romans became a principle of the ius gentium which could 
be applied where foreigners were involved. Especially, as in early Rome, 
Roman fides was contrasted to the fides of other nations (including the 
Greeks).36 One argument is that Roman fides developed into a universal 
                                            
24  Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties xlvi. Also see Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman 
Contract Law" 79. 
25  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 79. 
26  Verboven "Fides" 2670. 
27  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165.  
28  Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 6. 
29  Verboven "Fides" 2670. 
30  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 79; Zimmerman Law of 
Obligations 350-351; Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 391 sv 
"Clientes". 
31  Winkel 2010 Fundamina 582; Zimmerman Law of Obligations 350-351; Berger 
Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 391 sv "Clientes". 
32  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 351. Also see Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of 
Roman Law 391 sv "Clientes". 
33  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 80. 
34  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 80.  
35  Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 6. 
36  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165 n 68; Lind "The Republic and Roman Morality" 8; 
Schulz Principles of Roman Law 223. Buckland and McNair Roman Law 280 
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principle that applied to all nations, as evidenced by its use in international 
treaties, where the parties took a solemn oath to keep to the covenants of 
the treaty faithfully and without malice.37 This use of fides emphasised the 
essential meaning of fides, namely to keep one's word.38 Furthermore, 
those who surrendered to a Roman conqueror would place themselves 
under his fides (and thus his protection), which incorporated both the ideas 
of keeping one's word, and leniency and consideration to those under one's 
protection.39 As the principle of fides was used in international relations it 
has been argued that it developed into a universal principle that applied to 
all nations (and not only Romans) and became part of the ius gentium. 
Thereafter the ius gentium exerted an influence on the Roman fides by 
transforming it from a moral obligation into a legally binding one: 
It was particularly in the contractual field that the ius gentium exercised its 
influence, primarily by strengthening the element of reciprocal confidence 
(fides) without which relations with foreigners were hardly possible.40 
Finally, it remains to explain how the concept of fides developed into bona 
fides. There is much uncertainty in this respect,41 but an attractive theory is 
proposed by Schermaier. He argues that the peregrine praetor probably 
modelled the bona fidei iudiciae on the Roman fiduciary relationships.42 One 
of the fiduciary relationships, fiducia,43 was legally enforceable and did not 
rely on fides alone.44 The formula of the actio fiduciae demanded bene 
agere from the transferee (i.e. that he do well).45 This required that the 
transferee should act "carefully and prudently" and with respect for the 
interests of the other party.46 Schermaier argues that this standard of 
behaviour corresponds to that required under the bonae fidei iudiciae, which 
indicates that the actio fiduciae was most likely the forerunner of the bonae 
                                            
explains the difference between Roman fides and Greek fides as follows: "[N]o 
Greek trusted another unless he had the matter set down in writing." 
37  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 165, esp n 71.  
38  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 78-78; Lind "The Republic and 
Roman Morality" 7. 
39  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 78-79. 
40  Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 529 sv "Ius Gentium". Also see Kaser 
Roman Private Law 3. 
41  Sič 2008 Zbornik Radova 166 n 75. 
42  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 80. 
43  Fiducia can be described as "[a]n agreement (pactum fiduciae) in addition to a 
transfer of property through mancipatio (or in iure cessio) by which the transferee 
assumes certain duties as to the property transferred or the later retransfer thereof 
to the transferor" (Berger Encycopledic Dictionary of Roman Law 471 sv "Fiduciae"). 
See further Kaser Roman Private Law 126-127.  
44  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 80. 
45  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 82. 
46  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 82. Also see Kaser Roman Private 
Law 126-127. 
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fidei iudicia.47 He further argues that the term bona fides was probably used 
to emphasise the required standard of behaviour.48 Therefore, it referred not 
only to the meaning of fides of "keeping one's word" but also required that 
one act in accordance with a required standard of behaviour. 
2.1.2 Bona fides as used to correct and adapt the ius civile 
Even if it is accepted that the bonae fidei iudiciae can be traced back to the 
Roman concept of fides, some Greek influences can be identified in the use 
of bona fides to correct and adapt the ius civile. At the beginning of the 
Digest it is stated "ius est ars boni et aequi,"49 which can be translated as 
"the law is the art of goodness and fairness".50 It has been argued that this 
text refers to the function of aequitas in the development of Roman law: 
When the legal norms established in earlier law, written or not written, became 
inadequate to the social and economic necessities of the later age, the 
aequitas went into operation both in private law and in civil procedure as well 
as in judicial practice.51 
In this section the function of bona fides as an expression of aequitas to 
correct the injustices of the formal law (summum ius) is investigated. 
Specific consideration is given to Cicero's De Officiis. First, because it 
provides examples of this function of bona fides during the later republican 
period, and secondly, because it has been argued that Cicero's use of the 
term aequitas led to its use as a legal term.52  
The phrase summum ius is an abbreviation of the maxim summum ius 
summa iniuria, which can be translated as "more law less justice".53 It refers 
to the over-literal interpretation of laws that ultimately leads to injustice. In 
the first book of De Officiis, Cicero refers to the example of a man who, after 
agreeing to a thirty-day truce, destroys the enemy's fields at night and then 
justifies his behaviour by arguing that the truce referred to days and 
                                            
47  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 82. 
48  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 82. Also see Sič 2008 Zbornik 
Radova 166 n 75; Schulz Principles of Roman Law 228. 
49  D 1 1 1pr (quoted from Mommsen and Krueger Digest of Justinian).  
50  Quoted from Watson Digest of Justinian. Also see Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary 
of Roman Law 354 sv "Aequitas (aequum)". 
51  Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 354 sv "Aequitas (aequum)". 
52  Tuori "Aequitas" 132. Thomas 2003 De Jure 105 further argues that the De Officiis 
is an important source on Roman moral philosophy. 
53  Hiemstra and Gonin Trilingual Legal Dictionary 294. 
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therefore did not include nights.54 This led Cicero to argue that strict 
adherence to the law could lead to injustice.55  
Two further examples from Cicero have been used as evidence that the 
Romans treated bona fides as an expression of aequitas that was used to 
correct the injustices of the summum ius.56 First, Cicero tells of a case where 
the augurs were going to take an augury on the citadel and they ordered 
Tiberius Claudius Centumalus, whose house was on the Caelian Hill, to 
demolish that part of his house that was obstructing the auspices.57 
Claudius advertised the house and then sold it to Publius Calpurnius 
Lanarius, after which the augurs made the same demand of Calpurnius and 
he complied.58 When Calpurnius learned that Claudius had advertised the 
house after he was ordered to demolish a part of it, he compelled Claudius 
to go before an arbitrator as to "what compensation he ought to have made 
in accordance with the demands of good faith."59 Calpurnius had to 
formulate the action on good faith, as the ius civile did not provide him with 
a remedy.60 Cicero explains that in accordance with the Law of the Twelve 
Tables "it was enough that one [the buyer] should accept responsibility for 
those faults that were verbally specified" and "if the seller had denied these, 
he should face a double penalty".61 This meant that the seller was  
responsible for only the defects whose existence he expressly denied.62 
Accordingly, Claudius would be responsible for Calpurnius' loss only if he 
denied that there was any demand by the augurs for the demolition of part 
of the house. The judge ordered Claudius to compensate Calpurnius for the 
loss he had incurred because Claudius had known the facts when he sold 
the house to Calpurnius and had not informed him.63 In other words, if the 
seller knew about a fault or defect in the property but kept quiet about it, 
then he was responsible for it.64 Consequently, Cicero argues that the judge 
"established that it was a part of good faith that the buyer should learn of 
any fault that the seller knew".65 This example illustrates how bona fides 
                                            
54  Cicero De Officiis 1 33 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
55  Tuori "Aequitas" 132.  
56  Tuori "Aequitas" 132; Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 70.  
57  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
58  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
59  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
60  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 67. 
61  Cicero De Officiis 3 65 (quoted from Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). See further 
the discussion by Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 67. 
62  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 67. 
63  Cicero De Officiis 3 66 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
64  Cicero De Officiis 3 65 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
65  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
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was used to correct and adapt the ius civile by developing new rules to cater 
for new circumstances.  
Then, in a further example, Cicero illustrates how a rule developed by the 
concept of bona fides could itself become unjust and require further 
development in terms of the bona fides.66 He refers to the case where 
Marcus Marius Gratidianus sold a house to Gaius Sergius Orata, which he 
had bought from Orata a few years before.67 The house was under a liability 
(i.e. a third person had some right over the property) but Marius did not state 
this in the contract of sale.68 When the matter went to court, Orata's 
representatives argued that the court should adhere to the rule that the 
buyer should learn of any fault that the seller knew.69 In other words, he was 
arguing that the court should merely apply the existing rule (which rule 
derived from the bona fides) in accordance with the words and without 
further reference to the concept of bona fides. However, Gratidianus' 
representative argued for the application of aequitas (fairness) in that Orata 
was not deceived because as the previous owner he knew that the property 
was subject to a liability.70 In other words, he was arguing for the adaptation 
of the rule in accordance with the principle of aequitas in order to achieve 
justice.  
Cicero's use of the term bona fides together with the term aequitas indicates 
that Cicero regarded bona fides as an expression of aequitas which could 
be used to correct and adapt the ius civile where it would otherwise lead to 
injustice.71 Therefore, the use of bona fides in this context refers to the idea 
of aequitas. This is so because aequitas in the legal sense is usually 
described as a concept which refers to fairness and which is specifically 
contrasted with the strict following of the letter of the law.72 In turn, the 
Roman concept of aequitas has its origin in the Greek concept of epieíkeia 
(equity).73 Aristotle defined epieíkeia as "a correction of law where it is 
defective owing to its universality"74 and stated that: 
                                            
66  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 68. 
67  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
68  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
69  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
70  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties). 
71  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 70. 
72  Tuori "Aequitas" 132; Berger Encyclopedic Dictionary of Roman Law 354 sv 
"Aequitas (aequum)". 
73  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 65 n 9; Schulz Roman Legal 
Science 74. However, the extent of the Greek influence on the Roman concept of 
aequitas is the subject of extensive academic debate (see for example Tuori 
"Aequitas" 132).  
74  Artistotle Ethica Nicomachea 1137b27 (quoted from Ross "Ethica Nicomachea"). 
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[It] makes up for the defects of a community's written code of law. This is what 
we call equity; people regard it as just; it is, in fact, the sort of justice which 
goes beyond the written law.75 
Cicero and the other Roman orators understood aequitas as referring to 
epieíkeia.76 Cicero uses aequitas to refer to "fairness", which he contrasts 
with the strict following of the letter of the law.77 In other words, where bona 
fides was used to correct and adapt the ius civile, it was with reference to 
these Greek philosophical ideas. So while it would appear that the Romans 
used existing indigenous concepts to develop a more equitable law of 
contract, there is evidence that they borrowed from Greek philosophy in 
order to develop their existing rigid and formalistic legal system into a fairer 
and more flexible system that incorporated normative considerations based 
on fairness. 
2.2 Harmonisation of good faith and ubuntu in the South African 
common law of contract 
It has been argued that the South African common law of contract has 
shown resistance to the influence of ubuntu, because "[i]t could well be 
argued that contract law already has specific mechanisms to deal with the 
type of problems which ubuntu addresses".78 This argument ignores the 
constitutional ideal of transforming the existing traditional conservative legal 
culture into one based on plural values. As pointed out by Midgley and 
Keep,79 the transformation into a cohesive plural legal culture is needed in 
order to legitimise the new legal system under the Constitution. In other 
words, the legal system and legal culture in South Africa will be legitimate 
only if they reflect the values of all the diverse cultures existing within South 
Africa.80 They argue that "the notion of inclusivity that is inherent in ubuntu-
botho makes it an ideal overarching vehicle for expressing shared values".81 
Consequently, the recognition of ubuntu is intimately linked with the 
                                            
75  Aristotle Rhetorica 1374a24-27 (quoted from Roberts "Rhetorica"). 
76  Schulz Roman Legal Science 74. Jolowicz Roman Foundations 56 argues that 
Cicero and other rhetorical writers were aware of the indigenous origin of aequitas 
although he concedes that their thinking reflects a Greek influence. 
77  Cicero De Officiis 3 67 (Griffin and Atkins Cicero on Duties) (see again the discussion 
in the text at n 70 above). Also see Kaser Roman Private Law 28, who maintains 
that aequitas "denoted justice, especially that justice which the praetor applied by 
using his magisterial law to overcome the rigidity of the ius civile." 
78  Bennett 2011 PELJ 44. 
79  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 48. 
80  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 30, 48. 
81  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 448. Also see Rautenbach 
"Exploring the Contribution of Ubuntu" 309. 
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Constitution's transformative ideals,82 especially because ubuntu as a legal 
concept originated in the constitutional ideal of restorative justice.83 
It may be asked how the common law of contract could reflect plural values 
and whether this is even possible. Midgley and Keep84 argue that it is 
conceivable to harmonise what they call Western and African values 
because "there are universal values that transcend origins and boundaries". 
They refer to examples in South African jurisprudence where the 
Constitutional Court has harmonised values from different value systems.85 
More recently, Rautenbach cited further examples in support her argument 
that the courts have indeed shown a willingness "to include other 
(indigenous) legal norms into their reasoning".86 
In the context of contract law, this harmonisation between common law and 
customary values can also be observed. As was argued in the previous 
article, the courts have linked both good faith and ubuntu to the aims of 
justice, reasonableness and fairness in contracts.87  
Midgley and Keep88 argue that "harmonisation is possible if one focusses 
not so much on the cultural origins of a particular value, but on what the 
value seeks to express or achieve". In other words, although both concepts 
refer to justice, fairness and reasonableness, the question should be what 
justice, fairness and reasonableness in contract law should mean in the 
South African context today. As such, good faith should refer not merely to 
justice, fairness and reasonableness as understood in the common law 
tradition but should also be interpreted in accordance with a transformative 
constitutional approach including the underlying constitutional value of 
ubuntu. In their recent book, Bennett et al.89 specifically argue that ubuntu 
"imports a decidedly African understanding of right-doing to the law" and 
that the courts can use ubuntu to make the principle of good faith in contract 
law "more relevant to African conditions".90 
                                            
82  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 371. 
83  See the discussion in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 23-24. 
84  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 47. 
85  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 47-48. As an example, they cite 
Dikoko v Mokhatla 2006 6 SA 235 (CC), where the Court harmonised the values 
underlying the Roman law remedy of amende honorable with that of ubuntu. Also 
see Rautenbach 2015 AJICL 296-298; and Rautenbach "Exploring the Contribution 
of Ubuntu" 300-301. 
86  Rautenbach "Exploring the Contribution of Ubuntu" 302. 
87  See the discussion in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 4. 
88  Keep and Midgley "Emerging Role of Ubuntu-Botho" 48. 
89  Bennett, Munro and Jacobs Ubuntu 122. 
90  This is explored in more detail in the next theme (see para 3.2 below). 
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The Romans developed bona fides from the indigenous Roman concept of 
fides, but as an expression of aequitas it was influenced by Greek ideas. In 
particular, this influence can be observed in the role of bona fides to correct 
and adapt the ius civile to achieve justice and keep pace with the changing 
political, social and economic environment. In a similar manner, good faith 
as an existing principle of the common law of contract could also be 
developed in line with the ideals of ubuntu (an inherent value of customary 
law but also an underlying value of the Constitution).91 As will be argued 
below, infusing the concept of good faith with ubuntu will result in an 
improved promotion of substantive equality in the common law of contract.  
3  Concretising open norms intended to realise contractual 
justice 
3.1 Good faith: Balancing reciprocal individual rights and duties 
Prior to the introduction of the bonae fidei contracts, the closest the early 
Roman law came to recognising an agreement was through the formal legal 
act of stipulation (stipulatio) which was already in use by the time of the law 
of the Twelve Tables.92 Gaius93 explains that it entailed a formal verbal 
exchange of questions and answers between the debtor and the creditor. 
He mentions the following forms:  
"Do you solemnly promise conveyance? I solemnly promise conveyance"; 
"Will you convey? I will convey"; "Do you promise? I promise"; "Do you 
promise on your honour? I promise on my honour"; "Do you guarantee on your 
honour? I guarantee on my honour?"; "Will you do? I will do." 
As the stipulatio was a stricti iuris contract which formed part of the ius 
civile,94 the validity of the stipulatio came from the form used and not the 
agreement itself.95 For example, it was still valid where it was induced by 
fraud, fear or mistaken belief.96 Also, if the debtor used the wrong verb the 
creditor could not rely on the underlying agreement.97  
                                            
91  Himonga, Taylor and Pope 2013 PELJ 371. 
92  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 159; Zimmerman Law of Obligations 68. 
93  Gaius Inst 3 92 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). 
94  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 91; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 151. 
95  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 82-84; Kaser Roman Private Law 207. However, 
immoral, illegal or impossible stipulations were not valid (Watson Law of the Ancient 
Romans 60-61).  
96  See the discussion in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 21. For further examples see Gaius Inst 
3 97-101 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I).  
97  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 70. 
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The stipulatio was a unilateral contract which can be defined as a contract 
"which creates only rights in one party and only duties in the other".98 As 
Zimmerman99 explains: 
One party (the debtor) would be bound to perform towards the other (the 
creditor), but could not, under the same stipulation, acquire a counterclaim. 
Or, the other way round: the stipulation granted the creditor a right, without, at 
the same time, imposing a duty on him.  
Where the parties wanted to enter into a bilateral contract (for example a 
sale) the parties had to create two stipulations, i.e. two unilateral contracts, 
one where the buyer promised to pay the price and another where the seller 
promised to deliver the thing.100 This meant that the buyer could claim the 
thing even though he had not paid the price and the seller would be obliged 
to deliver.101 If the seller wanted to claim the price, he would need to institute 
a separate action and run the risk that the buyer could be insolvent at that 
time.102 This meant that in an action based on the stipulation to pay the 
price, the judge would not be permitted to take any account of the other 
stipulation for the delivery of the thing. Later, with the introduction and 
development of the exceptio doli, the seller would be able to defend an 
action by the buyer.103  
In contrast, a bona fide contract was bilateral in nature.104 In other words, a 
contract "which gives rise to reciprocal obligations, each party having both 
rights and duties".105 In addition, the judge in a bona fide action was directed 
to determine the case in accordance with the principle of good faith (ex fide 
bona).106 This enabled the judge to strike a balance between the interests 
of the parties, which was not possible where a unilateral contract was used. 
Specifically, Gaius states that "this involves that he [the judge] may take into 
account any counter-obligation due from the plaintiff under the same 
                                            
98  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162. Also see Zimmerman Law of Obligations 
91; Kaser Roman Private Law 169; De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part II 151.  
99  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 91. 
100  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 91; Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162. 
101  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162. 
102  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162. 
103  Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil Law paras 424, 699-704; Watson Law of the 
Ancient Romans 6; Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162 n 3. However, as 
mentioned in the previous article, the exceptio doli was introduced in 66 BC when 
the bona fide iudiciae already existed (see Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 21). 
104  Also referred to as synallagmatic contracts (Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil 
Law para 441). 
105  Nicholas Introduction to Roman Law 162; Van Warmelo Principles of Roman Civil 
Law para 441.  
106  See the discussion in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 14-15. 
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transaction, and may condemn the defendant only in the difference."107 
Schermaier108 argues that this required the judge to look at the relationship 
between the parties "in its origin and all its effects, within the framework of 
all surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties".  
Although the judge would attempt to achieve justice and fairness between 
the parties, it is important to note that the judge would not consider the social 
and economic position or bargaining power of the parties when determining 
what would be considered fair and equitable: 
The Roman lawyers worked within the framework of the existing social and 
procedural structures. Problems resulting from unequal bargaining power fell 
outside their sphere of competence and experience – as did social reform or 
social engineering in general.109 
Nevertheless, Winkel110 argues that the concept of bona fides did provide 
the judge with the necessary discretion to "take forms of undue influence or 
duress into account and so protect a weaker party". Hence bona fides could 
be used to protect a weaker party against exploitation by a stronger party 
and ensure justice and fairness between the parties. However, good faith 
did not focus on addressing the greater political, social and economic 
inequalities prevalent in Roman society itself. In other words, although bona 
fides could be used to protect a weaker party against exploitation by a 
stronger party in specific instances, it was not used to address the 
underlying unequal relationship between the parties in order to achieve a 
more egalitarian society. As Kelly eloquently remarks:111 
[T]he end result was not to turn the Republic into an egalitarian democracy in 
the modern sense. In the late Republic, wide differences of wealth and 
prestige existed … and political power was shared and disputed among a 
relatively small number of important families, who exercised it by operating a 
complicated system of alliance and dependence. 
3.2 uBuntu: Bringing about a more humane and egalitarian society 
It has been argued that the concept of fairness in the common law of 
contract should encapsulate the values from both good faith and ubuntu. 
                                            
107  Gaius Inst 4 61 (quoted from De Zulueta Institutes of Gaius Part I). Also see 
Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 82; Nicholas Introduction to 
Roman Law 164. 
108  Schermaier "Bona Fides in Roman Contract Law" 84 n 129. Also see Zimmerman 
Law of Obligations 140, 428; Kaser Roman Private Law 174-175. 
109  Zimmerman Law of Obligations 349-350. 
110  Winkel 2010 Fundamina 578-579. 
111  Kelly Roman Litigation 1. 
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Hence it is necessary to investigate what values these two concepts share, 
as well as how their values differ.  
One important similarity between good faith in Roman law and ubuntu's 
emerging role in the common law of contract has already been identified. It 
has been shown how both concepts can be used as an open norm to correct 
and supplement the existing law where justice requires it. The court in Botha 
v Rich referred to this link between reciprocity and the principle of good faith 
and held that good faith "contains the necessary flexibility to ensure 
fairness."112 The Court's statement is a confirmation of the historic nature of 
good faith to correct and adapt the existing laws where enforcing such laws 
would lead to injustice. It also aligns with the role of ubuntu as an open 
norm, as discussed in the previous article.113  
However, there is one important aspect in which the values of these norms 
differ from each other. While good faith was employed to promote justice 
and fairness between the two contracting parties only, ubuntu goes further 
in that it also promotes the achievement of an egalitarian society. In other 
words, while good faith was not used to promote greater equality between 
the community members of Roman society, ubuntu does support the ideal 
of social justice and the promotion of a more egalitarian society in South 
Africa.114  
The fact that ubuntu, as a legal concept, promotes both justice between the 
parties as well as a concern with the well-being of the community as a whole 
can be identified in Justice Langa's115 description of ubuntu in S v 
Makwanyane: 
It is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on the 
interdependence of the members of a community. It recognises a person's 
status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value and 
acceptance from the members of the community such a person happens to 
be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a 
corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance 
to each member of that community. More importantly, it regulates the exercise 
of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility and the 
mutual enjoyment of rights by all.  
                                            
112  Botha v Rich 2014 4 SA 124 (CC) para 45 (hereafter Botha v Rich). 
113  Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 25-28. 
114  More "Philosophy in South Africa" 156; Mokgoro 1998 PELJ 3. 
115  S v Makwanyane 1995 3 SA 391 (CC) para 224 (hereafter S v Makwanyane). Louw 
2013 PELJ 74 also refers to this definition of ubuntu when dealing with fairness in 
contracts. 
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Therefore, ubuntu (like good faith in Roman law) entails a balancing of the 
reciprocal rights and obligations between the contracting parties 
themselves. As such, it requires a court to analyse the relationship between 
the parties "in its origin and all its effects, within the framework of all 
surrounding circumstances and the conduct of the parties".116 However, in 
contrast to good faith in Roman law,117 ubuntu also encompasses a 
responsibility and duty of the individual to the greater community and aims 
to promote the political, social and economic interests of the community.118 
This can be identified where Justice Langa speaks of a corresponding duty 
towards each member of the community and the "sharing and co-
responsibility and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all."119 In other words, 
ubuntu is also concerned with the realisation and promotion of the socio-
economic well-being of all the community members.120 
This idea of ubuntu can also be identified in Port Elizabeth Municipality v 
Various Occupiers, which deals with the interpretation and application of the 
Prevention of Illegal Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 
of 1998 ("PIE").121 Justice Sachs held that: 
The Constitution and PIE confirm that we are not islands unto ourselves. The 
spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority of the 
population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines individual 
rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of the Bill of 
Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and operational 
declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human 
interdependence, respect and concern.122 
The fact that Justice Sachs states that ubuntu "combines individual rights 
with a communitarian philosophy" indicates that ubuntu would entail more 
                                            
116  Cf the quote by Schermaier on the role of good faith in Roman law at n 108 above. 
This is supported by Louw 2013 PELJ 66 n 92, who views ubuntu as "a mechanism 
for the infusion and promotion of a culture of co-operation in our contract law" and 
argues that such an approach "would be in line with the courts' recognition of an 
ethical standard of good faith based in ubuntu, and which would demand mutual 
respect for the interests and expectations of contracting parties." Also see 
Hawthorne 2008 SAPL 89-90. 
117  Cf the discussion in the text at n 109 above. 
118  Rautenbach "Exploring the Contribution of Ubuntu" 296. 
119  S v Makwanyane para 224 (my emphasis). The inseparable link between ubuntu and 
social justice can also be identified in Justice Madala's description of ubuntu in S v 
Makwanyane para 237. 
120  Also see Bhe v Magistrate, Khayelitsha (Commission for Gender Equality as Amicus 
Curiae); Shibi v Sithole; South African Human Rights Commission v President of the 
Republic of South Africa 2005 1 SA 580 (CC) para 163 referring to S v Makwanyane 
para 224 as quoted in n 119 above. 
121  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 2005 1 SA 217 (CC) (hereafter Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers). 
122  Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers para 37. 
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than a balancing of interests between the parties only, but would also be 
concerned with the interests of the greater community. Specifically, Justice 
Sachs speaks of the obligation to "balance competing interests in a 
principled way and to promote the constitutional vision of a caring 
society."123 So, although good faith historically refers to justice, 
reasonableness and fairness between the parties (without reference to their 
political, social or economic status), ubuntu as an underlying constitutional 
value requires the promotion of fairness in contracts that takes account of 
the ideas of restorative justice and the move towards a more egalitarian 
society, which would include a consideration of the political, social and 
economic status of the parties. This means that ubuntu does not only 
require that justice should be done between the parties with reference to 
their specific relationship; it would also require cognisance of the greater 
political, social and economic environment in which the transaction took 
place (i.e. the constitutional framework). Louw argues that the intention of 
the parties should be in line with the constitutional value system and its 
ambitions for an ideal constitutional community.124 Although he does not 
refer to ubuntu, it can be argued that his view accords with this idea of 
ubuntu, especially as he later argues that "[i]n the context of the 
constitutional values (and, especially ubuntu) this translates to Woolman's 
succinct observation that '[o]ne can contract only to do those things that are 
constitutionally permitted.'"125  
The most prominent example of how ubuntu has influenced the common 
law of contract in this way can be found in Barkhuizen v Napier. In the 
introduction of the first article it was shown how the Constitutional Court 
linked the public policy consideration of simple justice between man and 
man to ubuntu rather than good faith.126 The Court then laid down a two-
part test for determining the fairness of a contract clause.127 The first part of 
the test concerns the fairness of the clause itself and requires a balancing 
act between the policy considerations of freedom and sanctity of contract 
                                            
123  Although these comments were made in connection with the Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act 19 of 1998 ("PIE") only, it can be 
argued that they reflect the greater ideals of transformative constitutionalism in the 
private sphere. 
124 Louw 2013 PELJ 69.  
125  Louw 2013 PELJ 77 quoting Woolman 2008 SALJ 23. He further refers to Naudé's 
view that "'Fairness' entails not only fairness between the parties, but also doing 
justice in the eyes of the community as a whole. This requires the advancement of 
desirable goals of collective social welfare" (Louw 2013 PELJ 77-78 quoting Naudé 
2003 SALJ 827-828).  
126  Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 5 SA 323 (CC) (hereafter Barkhuizen v Napier) para 51 
as discussed in Du Plessis 2019 PELJ 4. 
127  Barkhuizen v Napier para 56.  
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which gives effect to the constitutional values of freedom and human dignity 
on the one hand, and another policy consideration as reflected in a 
constitutional right or value (in casu the right to access to justice) in support 
of the non-enforcement of the contract on the other.128 This examination is 
objective in nature as it deals with these values on an abstract level, as 
reflected in the terms of the contract itself.129 The Court further held that if 
the clause objectively does not violate public policy, it must be determined 
whether the clause itself violates public policy in the light of the relative 
situations of the contracting parties, which would include an assessment of 
the bargaining positions of the parties.130 This determination is subjective in 
nature.131 This subjective enquiry promotes socio-economic rights and 
substantive equality, and therefore it has been argued that this extension 
was inspired by ubuntu.132 The second part of the test for fairness 
investigates whether, in spite of the fact that the clause itself does not violate 
public policy, enforcement of the clause would be fair in the light of the 
circumstances which prevented compliance therewith.133 Again, the second 
part of the test is subjective in nature and promotes substantive equality.134 
Accordingly, it too is inspired by ubuntu.135  
The concern for the promotion of social justice and a more egalitarian 
society can also be identified in Botha v Rich. The court referred to its 
constitutional obligation in terms of section 39(2) to develop any legislation 
in accordance with the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights as well 
as the constitutional ideal of transforming "a society based on injustice and 
exclusion from the democratic process to one founded on the supremacy of 
the Constitution, the rule of law and the values of human dignity and 
equality".136 The court also argued for an interpretation that would promote 
equality between the parties, which would indicate that the court was 
conscious of the constitutional aim of a more egalitarian society.137 Clearly, 
                                            
128  Barkhuizen v Napier para 57.  
129  Barkhuizen v Napier para 59 where the Court refers to the "objective terms" of the 
contract. Also see Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398; Botha 2009 Stell LR 212.  
130  Barkhuizen v Napier para 59.  
131  Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553; Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 398. 
132  Bhana and Broeders 2014 THRHR 175; Cornell and Muvangua "Introduction" 24; 
Hawthorne 2010 De Jure 400. 
133  Barkhuizen v Napier para 56. 
134  Barkhuizen v Napier para 59. Also see Wallis 2016 SALJ 552-553; Bhana and 
Meerkotter 2015 SALJ 504; Bhana 2014 SAPL 509. 
135  See again the sources listed in n 132 above. See further Bennett, Munro and Jacobs 
Ubuntu 69, where the authors argue that ubuntu was used by the minority court in 
Everfresh Market Virginia (Pty) Ltd v Shoprite Checkers (Pty) Ltd 2012 1 SA 256 
(CC) to promote substantive equality in the law of contract. 
136  Botha v Rich para 28. 
137  Botha v Rich para 40. 
HM DU PLESSIS  PER / PELJ 2019 (22)  19 
this is in line with the idea of ubuntu that promotes social justice. Hence the 
court's judgment can be seen as an example of the harmonisation of ubuntu 
and good faith in the common law of contract in accordance with 
constitutional values (despite the fact that ubuntu is not mentioned).  
4 Conclusion 
Four themes have been discussed in order to investigate a more contextual 
legal history of good faith in Roman contract law in a way that could inform 
the emerging role of ubuntu in the South African common law of contract. 
In the first place, it was shown how good faith in Roman law was used to 
address legal pluralism and political, social and economic changes in the 
society and that ubuntu can be used in a similar way to legitimise the new 
legal system in South Africa. Secondly, it was argued that like good faith, 
which was used as an open norm to correct and adapt the existing rules of 
Roman law, ubuntu also requires a normative approach to the interpretation 
and application of the existing law. Thirdly, it was shown how the idea of 
good faith as an open norm in Roman law was inspired by Greek 
philosophy, and it was argued that ubuntu as an underlying value of the 
customary law can infuse good faith in the common law of contract in a 
similar fashion. Finally, an important distinction between the two concepts 
was identified. Although both concepts promote contractual justice between 
the parties, ubuntu entails a further duty to promote the social and economic 
well-being of the parties as well as of the greater community. Hence, in 
contrast to good faith, ubuntu is concerned with the promotion of substantive 
equality in private dealings. 
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